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I. Introduction
Reservation wages play a key role in search theory, wherein optimal job search implies the reservation wage property and the optimal stopping rule. Despite its key role in theory, however, most empirical search studies have been conducted in the absence of reservation wage data, at best identifying this basic search-theoretic element through theoretical and auxiliary restrictions (e.g. Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001) . For their part, the much sparser group of studies with direct evidence on reservation wages (surveyed in Devine and Kiefer, 1991) have largely been based on single survey responses, and typically contain little retrospective information about employment or income histories. And in neither case is there comparative evidence.
The present exercise is exploratory. We deploy a unique cross-country data set that combines survey information on the lowest wages that unemployed respondents are willing to accept with detailed information on their employment and income histories to examine three key features of the stationary job search model. First, we examine the association between reservation wages and unemployment benefits. Second, we provide the first evidence of which we are aware on the role of the arrival rate of job offers in elevating reservation wages. Finally, exploiting the longitudinal capacity of our data set, we determine whether reservation wages decline over the jobless spell.
II. Reservation Wages: The Associations Suggested by Theory
Assuming income-maximizing workers, infinite lives, unemployment benefits and jobs (once accepted), sampling without recall, wage offers that are independent realizations from a known wage offer distribution and received according to a Poisson process with parameterδ , the reservation wage rate can be written:
where b is the (constant) amount of unemployment benefits net of any search costs, ρ is the discount rate, w is the wage offer, and F(w) is the cumulative wage distribution (Mortensen, 1977) . Evaluating the integral and rearranging terms gives
which makes more transparent the role of the reservation wage in equating the marginal costs and benefits of continued search.
Familiarly, then, changes in the independent variables affect either the marginal costs or benefits of additional search, producing offsetting changes in the reservation wage. Specifically, the derivatives of the reservation wage with respect to unemployment benefits, the arrival rate of job offers, and the mean of the wage offer distribution are all positive, while the derivative of the reservation wage with respect to the discount rate is negative.
The central assumption of the model is that reservation wages are time invariant because the present discounted value of accepting a job offer is continuous and increasing in w, and because the present discounted value of unemployed search does not depend on any particular offered wage, only the distribution.
III. Data
Our data are taken from the first six waves of the European Community Household Germany and the United Kingdom are for the first three waves alone because of missing data on reservation wages and job offers, respectively, in subsequent waves; and for the Netherlands information on reservation wages was missing for the years 1994 and 1995.
For us the key pieces of information contained in the EHCP are reservation wages, unemployment duration, and job offer rates. In the EHCP every individual actively looking for work is asked two questions pertaining first to desired hours of work and second to the minimum income required to work these hours. The actual questions are: "Assuming you could find suitable work, how many hours would you prefer to work in this new job?" and "What is the minimum net monthly income would you accept to work [these number of] hours a week in this new job?" The key reservation wage construct used in this paper is an hourly net reservation wage, computed as the ratio of desired net monthly income to the optimal number of hours.
This variable was deflated by the respective national consumer price index, as were all other nominal arguments.
The measure of unemployment duration is strictly length of the jobless spell. For those actively seeking employment we know both the month and year of the interview 2 as well as the date on which the previous job was lost. The difference in months is a measure of joblessness since it may include intervals of inactivity.
Finally, as far as the measure of job offers is concerned, the EHCP inquires of those seeking employment whether or not they had received a job offer in the previous month; specifically, "Have you received any job offer during the past 4 weeks?" We use this information on the receipt (and rejection) of job offers to proxy the arrival rate of job offers. According to the model, reservation wages should be increasing in the arrival rate of job offers.
IV. Findings
First consider the determinants of reservation wages. It can be seen that the coefficient estimate for the unemployment benefits dummy is positive and well determined for five countries in the sample. For these countries -Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, and Spain -the effect on reservation wages of access to benefits is quite strong. For its part, the impact of having received a job offer is typically positive as one would anticipate -although this has not been demonstrated before -and in six cases is statistically significant. When benefits are expressed in monthly values, their influence is statistically significant in six cases (albeit not necessarily for the same countries). In this case, however, the elasticities are typically small. The principal exception is the United Kingdom where a 10 percent increase in benefit levels elevates reservation wages by 4 percent. Now the effect of job offers is much attenuated.
We next exploit the longitudinal capacity of our dataset to informally inquire into the course of reservation wages over jobless duration. To this end, the log hourly reservation wage is regressed on the log of elapsed jobless duration for an unbalanced panel of unemployed workers. This procedure should be thought of as a strictly descriptive exercise because of potential simultaneity. That is to say, reservation wages influence duration with certainty, but they may themselves also be influenced by duration.
( Table 2 near here) Abstracting from simultaneity issues, Table 2 presents fixed and random effects specifications of the reservation wage equation, where the latter account for crosssection variation over the sample period. For the fixed effects specification in the second column of the table -which provides a meaningful control for individual heterogeneity -the coefficient estimates for jobless duration are statistically significant for just one country in the sample: Spain. And even here the coefficient estimate is very small and is only marginally significant. There is slightly greater evidence of a negative association between duration and reservation wages from the random effects specification, where we observe well-determined negative associations for Austria, Portugal, and (again) Spain. That said, the more important point is that reservation wages seem to be stationary for the large majority of countries, consistent with the basic search model if not with the early literature surveyed in Devine and Kiefer (1991) .
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have exploited a cross-country dataset -the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) -to examine directly (some aspects of) the role of reservation wages in the job search model. This is something of a new departure insofar as reservation wages are typically identified indirectly through theoretical and auxiliary restrictions. It is only something of a new departure, however, because other studies have also looked at direct evidence on reservation wages in individual countries. Our treatment differs from that sub-literature not simply in its cross-country basis but also with respect to its findings.
We have seen that both receipt and higher levels of unemployment insurance benefits translate into higher reservation wages, even if some of the point estimates are not statistically significant and the computed elasticities are quite small. The muted nature of the latter might indicate that there is not enough variation of replacement rates within countries. We have also uncovered for the first time the positive impact of the arrival rate of job offers on reservation wages.
Finally, again consistent with the basic model, we report that there is scant evidence of a decline in reservation wages with longer joblessness (see also Prasad, 2003) . Indeed, the reservation wage appears stationary. The fact that reservation wages appear to be constant is interesting in itself, and may explain why unemployment rates are higher in Europe. Long (and in some cases near-lifetime) maximum duration of benefits may lie at the root of the problem. Standard errors in parentheses ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels Note: The regressions include a gender dummy and 3 schooling, 4 age, and 5 time dummies.
